China has spent decades building a land-based missile force designed to keep the United States out of a fight over Taiwan — and U.S. officials say it now threatens every major airfield, port and military installation across the Western Pacific.

As Washington races to build its own long-range fires, analysts warn that the land domain has become the most overlooked — and potentially decisive — part of the U.S.–China matchup. Interviews with military experts show a contest defined not by tanks or troop movements, but by missile ranges, base access and whether U.S. forces can survive the opening salvos of a war that may begin long before any aircraft take off.

‘The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force … has built an increasing number of short-, medium-, and long-range missiles,’ Seth Jones of the Center for Strategic and International Studies told Fox News Digital. ‘They have the capability to shoot those across the first and increasingly the second island chains.’

For years, Chinese officials assumed they could not match the United States in air superiority. The Rocket Force became the workaround: massed, land-based firepower meant to shut down U.S. bases and keep American aircraft and ships outside the fight.

‘They didn’t think that they could gain air superiority in a straight-up air-to-air fight,’ said Eric Heginbotham, a research scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. ‘So you need another way to get missiles out — and that another way is by building a lot of ground launchers.’

The result is the world’s largest inventory of theater-range missiles, backed by hardened underground facilities, mobile launchers and rapid shoot-and-scoot tactics designed to overwhelm U.S. defenses.

Despite China’s numerical edge, American forces still hold advantages Beijing has not yet matched — particularly in targeting and survivability. 

U.S. missiles, from Tomahawks to SM-6s to future hypersonic weapons, are tied into a global surveillance network the People’s Liberation Army cannot yet replicate. American targeting relies on satellites, undersea sensors, stealth drones and joint command tools matured over decades of combat experience.

‘The Chinese have not fought a war since the 1970s,’ Jones said. ‘We see lots of challenges with their ability to conduct joint operations across different services.’ 

The U.S., by contrast, has built multi-domain task forces in the Pacific to integrate cyber, space, electronic warfare and precision fires — a level of coordination analysts say China has yet to demonstrate.

Jones said China’s defense industry also faces major hurdles. 

‘Most of (China’s defense firms) are state-owned enterprises,’ he said. ‘We see massive inefficiency, the quality of the systems … we see a lot of maintenance challenges.’

Still, the United States faces a near-term problem of its own: missile stockpiles.

‘We still right now … would run out (of long-range munitions) after roughly a week or so of conflict over, say, Taiwan,’ Jones said.

Washington is trying to close that gap by rapidly expanding production of ground-launched weapons. New Army systems — Typhon launchers, high mobility artillery rocket system, batteries, precision strike missiles and long-range hypersonic weapons with a range exceeding 2,500 kilometers — are designed to hold Chinese forces at risk from much farther away.

Heginbotham said the shift is finally happening at scale. 

‘We’re buying anti-ship missiles like there’s no tomorrow,’ he said.

If current plans hold, U.S. forces will field roughly 15,000 long-range anti-ship missiles by 2035, up from about 2,500 today.

China’s missile-heavy strategy is built to overwhelm U.S. bases early in a conflict. The United States, meanwhile, relies on layered air defenses: Patriot batteries to protect airfields and logistics hubs, terminal high altitude area defense (THAAD) interceptors to engage ballistic missiles at high altitude, and Aegis-equipped destroyers that can intercept missiles far from shore.

Heginbotham warned the U.S. will need to widen that defensive mix. 

‘We really need a lot more and greater variety of missile defenses and preferably cheaper missile defenses,’ he said.

One of Washington’s biggest advantages is its ability to conduct long-range strikes from beneath the ocean. U.S. submarines can fire cruise missiles from virtually anywhere in the Western Pacific, without relying on allied basing and without exposing launchers to Chinese fire — a degree of stealth China does not yet possess.

Command integration is another area where Beijing continues to struggle. American units routinely train in multi-domain operations that knit together air, sea, cyber, space and ground-based fires. 

Jones and Heginbotham both noted that the People’s Liberation Army has far less experience coordinating forces across services and continues to grapple with doctrinal and organizational problems, including the dual commander–political commissar structure inside its missile brigades.

Alliances may be the most consequential difference. Japan, the Philippines, Australia and South Korea provide depth, intelligence sharing, logistics hubs and potential launch points for U.S. forces. 

China has no comparable network of partners, leaving it to operate from a much narrower geographic footprint. In a missile war, accuracy, integration and survivability often matter more than sheer volume — and in those areas the United States still holds meaningful advantages.

At the heart of this competition is geography. Missiles matter less than the places they can be launched from, and China’s ability to project power beyond its coastline remains sharply constrained.

‘They’ve got big power-projection problems right now,’ Jones said. ‘They don’t have a lot of basing as you get outside of the first island chain.’

The United States faces its own version of that challenge. Long-range Army and Marine Corps fires require host-nation permission, turning diplomacy into a form of firepower. 

‘It’s absolutely central,’ Heginbotham said. ‘You do need regional basing.’

Recent U.S. agreements with the Philippines, along with expanded cooperation with Japan and Australia, reflect a push to position American launchers close enough to matter without permanently stationing large ground forces there.

A U.S.–China land conflict would not involve armored columns maneuvering for territory. The decisive question is whether missile units on both sides can fire, relocate and fire again before being targeted.

China has invested heavily in survivability, dispersing its brigades across underground bunkers, tunnels and hardened sites. Many can fire and relocate within minutes. Mobile launchers, decoys and deeply buried storage complexes make them difficult to neutralize.

U.S. launchers in the Pacific would face intense Chinese surveillance and long-range missile attacks. After two decades focused on counterterrorism, the Pentagon is now reinvesting in deception, mobility and hardened infrastructure — capabilities critical to surviving the opening stages of a missile war.

Any U.S. intervention in a Taiwan conflict would also force Washington to confront a politically charged question: whether to strike missile bases on the Chinese mainland. Doing so risks escalation; avoiding it carries operational costs.

‘Yes … you can defend Taiwan without striking bases inside China,’ Heginbotham said. ‘But you are giving away a significant advantage.’

Holding back may help prevent the conflict from widening, but it also allows China to keep firing. 

‘It’s a reality of conflict in the nuclear age that almost any conflict is gonna be limited in some ways,’ Heginbotham said. ‘Then the question becomes where those boundaries are drawn, can you prevent it from spreading? What trade-offs you’re willing to accept?’

A U.S.–China clash on land would not be fought by massed armies. It would be a missile war shaped by geography, alliances and survivability — a contest where political access and command integration matter as much as raw firepower.

For the United States, the challenge is clear: build enough long-range missiles, secure the basing needed to use them and keep launchers alive under fire. For China, the question is whether its vast missile arsenal and continental depth can offset weaknesses in coordination, command structure and real-world combat experience.

The side that can shoot, relocate and sustain fire the longest will control the land domain — and may shape the outcome of a war in the Pacific.

This is the third installment of a series comparing U.S. and Chinese military capabilities. Feel free to check out earlier stories comparing sea and air capabilities.

Erika Kirk has announced that she is to meet privately with commentator Candace Owens marking the first direct conversation between the two after a period of public discussion and differing perspectives that emerged after her late husband’s death.

Kirk shared the update in a brief statement on X on Sunday, saying both women had agreed to pause all public commentary until after the meeting.

‘Candace Owens and I are meeting for a private, in-person discussion on Monday, December 15,’ Erika said.

‘@RealCandaceO and I have agreed that public discussions, livestreams, and tweets are on hold until after this meeting. I look forward to a productive conversation. Thank you,’ Erika added.

The planned discussion between Erika and the former Turning Point USA employee reflects an effort by the women to address weeks of mounting tensions over conspiracy theories online in a more thoughtful and personal setting.

At a recent CBS town hall Erika expressed the emotional toll of widespread online speculation surrounding her husband’s passing, ‘Stop. That’s it. That’s all I have to say. Stop.’ when asked what she had to say to people making unfounded claims.

‘When you go after my family, my Turning Point USA family, my Charlie Kirk Show family, when you go after the people that I love, and you’re making hundreds and thousands of dollars every single episode going after the people that I love because somehow they’re in on this, no,’ Erika also said on ‘Outnumbered’ Dec. 10.

The relationship between the two women has deteriorated sharply in recent months, despite their earlier history of collaboration and personal friendship.

The recent events have placed them on different sides of a sensitive moment and their decision to meet privately shows signs of a mutual desire to speak directly while reducing misunderstandings and avoiding further speculation.

Kirk, who now leads TPUSA, has been focused publicly on preserving her husband Charlie Kirk’s legacy since his tragic death in September.

After more than eight years of Democrat lawfare against President Trump, his aides and his allies, the Justice Department under Attorney General Pam Bondi is bringing much-needed accountability — which is what American voters demanded in our last presidential election. But Democrat activist judges are doing what they do best: weaponization and sabotage.

In South Carolina, Clinton-appointed Judge Cameron Currie — handpicked by a Biden-appointed judge — wrongly disqualified Eastern District of Virginia U.S. Attorney Lindsey Halligan, the bold and fearless prosecutor who had secured an indictment against former FBI Director James Comey for lying and obstruction of a Senate investigation into his politicization, weaponization, and corruption of the intel agencies and law enforcement to go after political enemies and protect political allies. The government is appealing that decision to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.  Now, another Clinton-appointed judge in the District of Columbia, Colleen Kollarr-Kotelly, has interfered even more egregiously with the government’s case. This ruling threatens the separation of powers essential to the Republic, and either the D.C. Circuit or Supreme Court must intervene immediately.

Comey was indicted on two charges: making false statements to Congress and obstruction of Congress. The indictment stemmed from the events surrounding Operation Crossfire Hurricane, more colloquially known as the Russiagate hoax. Comey used his longtime friend, Columbia Law Professor Daniel Richman, as a conduit to leak material unfavorable to President Trump to media outlets. In addition to being a law professor, Richman was a government contractor. He and Comey communicated frequently via email on government and private accounts. Communications on a government email account enjoy no reasonable expectation of privacy — the standard under the Fourth Amendment as a result of Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United States (1967) — because the government can monitor its own email servers.

Six years ago, even Obama-appointed Judge James Boasberg, a judicial disgrace about whom we often have written, signed a warrant authorizing the search and seizure of emails on Richman’s computer and iCloud account and his account at Columbia. Richman was able to review all emails and withhold the information he deemed privileged from all but one account. Now, Richman — who was the recipient of many emails from Comey and the sender of many emails to him — has sought to reclaim those emails pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g). This rule allows an individual to ask a court to reclaim his property obtained pursuant to an unlawful search and/or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Shockingly, Kollar-Kotelly granted the motion and has ordered the FBI to destroy the emails by 4 p.m. on Monday.  Kollar-Kotelly’s ruling ordered the destruction of emails obtained pursuant to a warrant signed by another (Obama) judge six years ago.  She claims that the seized information relates to a new investigation; however, she is basing this assertion on a decision by Eastern District of Virginia U.S. Magistrate Judge William Fitzpatrick. Fitzpatrick issued a suppression-like decision even though suppression was not briefed by the parties — yet another example of blatant and unlawful judicial sabotage by partisans in robes.

Collar-Kotelly has ordered that a copy of the emails be given to Biden-appointed Judge Michael Nachmanoff, who is presiding over the Comey case in Virginia. This salvation of a copy of the emails, however, does not lessen the impact of Kollar-Kotelly’s horrible ruling. The FBI and the prosecution will be unable to review them in their efforts to seek a new indictment if Currie’s dismissal ruling survives on appeal. The statute-of-limitations law allows the government only six months after an indictment’s dismissal, suspended during the appellate process, to seek a new indictment. The inability to view this evidence would substantially increase the time necessary to seek an indictment.  Even if a higher court reverses Currie, the government’s inability to review the emails to use as evidence and prepare for trial would massively hamper its case.

Kollar-Kotelly’s decision is more disturbing because it implicates the separation of powers. Usually, Rule 41(g) comes into play where a defendant has had property wrongly seized, and he moves to reclaim it. Here, Comey is not seeking to reclaim anything; Richman, a then-government contractor with whom Comey communicated extensively about government business, is seeking this evidence. Richman has run to a partisan Democrat judge not even involved in the criminal case — and not even in the same district — to procure the destruction of crucial evidence in that case in an obvious effort to assist his friend Comey. Comey cannot challenge the warrant against Richman because he lacks standing to do so. Incredibly, Kollar-Kotelly suggested that Richman could move to quash this evidence in Virginia.  She’s going way out of her way to help Comey. Judges presiding over cases often have excluded evidence against defendants as having been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. It is, however, extraordinary for a different judge — especially in a different district — to interfere in and dramatically hamper the prosecution’s case based on a claim by a third party of a wrongful search and seizure, especially when the evidence the government wishes to use consists of communications between that third party and the defendant — a defendant who was a senior government official.

The government obtained the evidence it wishes to use against Comey pursuant to a lawful warrant, even one signed by a highly partisan Obama-appointed judge. Now, a Clinton-appointed judge who is not presiding over the case — and is not even in the same district — is blatantly trying to aid Comey by preventing the government from using that evidence either to re-indict Comey or try him if the original indictment is reinstated. This ruling contravenes the normal way in which Rule 41(g) applies. The Clinton judge’s staggering timeline — destruction by tomorrow afternoon — also illustrates her agenda. She should have stayed a ruling of such magnitude to allow the appellate process to play out.  Instead, she has put the government in an incredibly precarious position: having to obtain a stay from either the D.C. Circuit or the Supreme Court in just a few hours. Kollar-Kotelly’s order had no legal basis, and a higher court must put a stop to it.

Kollar-Kotelly’s ruling is part of a larger pattern. Leftist judges like Obama-appointed D.C. Judge Tanya Chutkan — who presided over President Trump’s January 6-related case, Boasberg, who signed off on the national disgrace that was Operation Arctic Frost, and many other Democrat judges did nothing to stop and did much to escalate the lawfare waged against President Trump, his aides, and his allies. Now, the Justice Department is seeking legal accountability for lawfare perpetrators like Comey. Currie and Kollar-Kotelly have endeavored to prevent — or, at the very least, drastically decrease the chances of — such legal accountability. Courts do not order the FBI to destroy evidence in pending investigations, except when the evidence is harmful to a lawfare perpetrator like Comey. The inconsistency between the treatment afforded lawfare perpetrators and lawfare targets threatens the very legitimacy of the federal judiciary. If higher courts do not reign in these rogue judges, Congress must do so through oversight, withholding of funds from judicial appropriations, and impeachment.  A system where the judiciary enables lawfare and then shields its perpetrators from legal consequences is unsustainable, and higher courts must put a stop to it.